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Abstract 
We determine the equilibrium timing of a capacity expansion in a mar-
ket with many potential investors. The problem is solved with two different 
methods. First we solve the problem from the point of view of a central 
planner, using a theorem previously derived in Kobila (1991). This method 
also gives the monopoly solution. Secondly we derive the market equilib-
rium by using a Skorohod stochastic differential equation. The equilibrium 
turns also out to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with two or more 
players. Thus even the oligopoly solution is socially efficient. Finally we 
discuss risk adjustment. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on optimal irreversible investment under uncertainty has been 
rapidly growing over the last decade. Recently developed stochastic optimization 
techniques offer new insight into the combined effect of uncertainty and irre-
versibility. These methods were first applied to financial option value problems, 
but have later been applied to real options, i. e. investments in physical capital. 
Important contributions include Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald 
and Siegel (1986). These applications consider the investment problem of an 
agent having only one investment opportunity. 
Pindyck (1988) solves the problem of optimal capacity choice and capacity 
expansion under uncertainty of future demand and irreversibility of investment, 
given specific functional forms. He explicitly states the problem of evaluating a 
marginal unit of capacity as an option value problem and establishes the link to 
financial option value techniques. A more general solution to the same problem 
is obtained in Kobila (1991), using a direct approach based on a generalization 
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. 
In this paper we generalize the valuation of real options to the case where 
the investment decision influences the market price. The outline of the paper is 
as follows. In Section 2 we apply the results from Kobila (1991) to derive the 
socially optimal investment decision - maximizing total willingness to pay when 
the demand function is subject to random shifts. We show that the optimal in-
vestment strategy is to invest once the price of the produced commodity reaches 
a specific level, the "trigger price". In section 3 we show that the optimal invest-
ment strategy in the monopoly case is of the same form as the socially optimal 
strategy, but with a higher trigger price. 
In Section 4 we assume that the investments are undertaken by profit-maximizing 
firms, and derive the equilibrium solution. We will assume that all investors can 
expand their capacity infinitely fast at a constant unit cost per capacity unit. 
With this assumption it turns out that in equilibrium the real investment option 
has no value. This is not surprising, when all investors have an infinite amount 
of the same option, the market value of the option must be zero. 
The equilibrium solution is of course socially efficient, hence the trigger price 
is the same as the one found in section 2. In section 5 we will also show that the 
solution is a sub game perfect Nash-equilibrium in a game with a small number 
of players. This requires some extra condition to make sure that full capacity 
utilization always will be a Bertrand equilibrium. With these extra conditions 
the oligopoly solution is socially efficient as well. 
Risk adjustment is discussed in section 6. According to the Consumption 
based Capital Asset Pricing Model ( CCAPM) a risk free discount rate is justified 
if the price of the product is uncorrelated with the market portfolio. If the price 
is correlated with the market portfolio, it turns out that the appropriate risk 
adjustment consists in giving the expected growth rate of the output price a 
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constant adjustment, and use the risk-free discount rate. 
In section 7 we will demonstrate a connection to traditional real option the-
ory. The traditional option value of an investment opportunity is equal to the 
difference between the alue of a unit capacity with non-reflected and reflected 
pnce processes. 
2 Socially optimal investment with risk neu-
trality 
In order to find the socially optimal investment strategy, the planner seeks to 
maximize the expected discounted welfare function less investment cost. The 
objective function is given by 
(1) 
Here W(Qt, Kt) is the total willingness to pay function depending on capacity 
Kt, and the stochastic process Qt. That capacity and not actual supply enters 
W is justified by assuming full capacity utilization. Since we specify no variable 
costs, efficiency requires full capacity utilization. The scalars corresponding to 
the processes Qt and Kt are denoted by q and k. The optimal value function H 
depends on time as well as on the two state variables. Ut denotes investments 
and C is the investment cost which is assumed constant. The discount rate is r 
and is here assumed constant. 
The stochastic process Qt is assumed to be exogenous and is specified as a 
geometric Brownian motion, 
(2) 
where 1J is the expected growth rate and 0"2 is the expected variance of the in-
crements over a unit time interval, conditional on Qt. Qt is a parameter in the 
demand function. It may be interpreted as total income for the consumers of the 
good or as a parameter of changing tastes. Note that since Qt is exogenous, the 
demand is independent of the production in the sector we study. This implies 
that we implicitly assumes that the sector under study is too small to contribute 
significantly to the total income in the economy. 
We assume that the capacity can be increased instantaneously, and that the 
investments are irreversible. Capacity expansion is given by 
(3) 
We will allow the rate of investment Ut to be infinite, or rather allow the pro-
cess Kt singular components. In this case ( 1) is no longer the correct formulation, 
and we will replace it with 
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H(t, q, k) =sup Et,q,k{l"" W( Q,, K,)e-r"ds- ce-r"dK,}. ( 4) 
u. t 
The solution to the stochastic control problem (4) when W is linear (affine) 
in q is given by Theorem 3 in Kobila (1991). In the notation of this paper, we 
have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 Let Qt be a geometric Brownian motion as given by {2). Suppose 
that the function W(q, k) is linear (affine) in q, i.e., 
W(q,k) = qF(k)- v(k), (5) 
with F' ( k) > 0 and F" < 0. Suppose that we only consider controls Ut such that 
Kt :::; 'kmax. Let /1 be the positive root and /2 the negative root of the characteristic 
equation 
1 2 2 1 2 
-u 1 + ( TJ - -u )I - r = 0. 2 2 (6) 
Then the solution to 
H(t, q, k) =sup Et,q,k[l"" W( Q,, K,)e-r"ds- Ce-r"dKsJ, (7) 
.... t 
is given by H = h, where 
h(t, q, k) = 2e-rt [-q'Yl r W(s, k) ds + q1'2 r W(s, k) ds]. (8) 
(11-12)u2 loo s·n+1 Jo s-r2+l 
W(q, k) is given by 
- { W(q,k) 
W(q,k) = W(q,<P(q))- rC · (<P(q)- k) 
fork> <P(q) 
otherwise (9) 
where k = <P(q) denotes the inverse function of q = '1/J(k), and '1/J is determined by 
the equation 
C = _2_'1/J(k)-r2 (1/J(k) Wk(s, k) ds. 
u 211 lo s72+1 
The optimal capacity process is 
Remark The corresponding optimal control is, heuritically 
u*(t,q,k)={ ~ for q < '1/J ( k) or k > 'kmax 
otherwise 
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(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
The optimal investment strategy given by (12) - resulting in a stochastic 
process K; of optimal capacity - represents a singular solution where optimal 
investment is either 0 or oo. Under reasonable assumptions we cannot have 
Ut = oo on a time interval of positive length, hence, the solution will be of 
the following form: There exists an open subset A of the ( q, k )-plane such that 
Ut = oo if and only if ( Qt, Kt) E A. If the process ( Qt, K;) starts within A 
it will immediately be thrown out of A, and it is impossible for the process to 
enter A from the outside. The Kt component of the process will jump vertically 
to the boundary 8A of A if ( Qt, K;) starts inside A. In Kobila (1989) we have 
shown that ( Qt, K;) is a Markov process with horizontal movements outside A 
and vertical reflection on 8A. 
Proof (sketch) A complete proof of this theorem is given in Kobila (1991). 
The main idea is first to prove an extension of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
(HJB) equation (see 0ksendal (1989)) where equality is required only for q ::; 
'lj;(k). Guessing that His of the form H(t, q, k) = G(q, k)e-rt, the HJB equation 
can be written: 
1 W(q k) - rG + 71qG' + -u2 q2 G" < 0 
' ., q 2 qq - ' (13) 
with equality for q::; 'lj;(k). It is easy to verify that g(q, k) = h(t, q, k)ert satisfy 
this equation. A separate argument must be used to prove that the expected net 
present profit using the control u* in fact gives the supremum of expected net 
present profit over all u < oo. QED 
In the theorem the cost C per unit investment is allowed to depend upon the 
amount of capacity already installed. In our application we will consider the case 
where Cis constant. For the details of the proof and the intuitive explanation of 
the singular investment strategy (12), see Kobila (1990). 
Integrating (10) and using the relation between the roots of the characteristic 
equation 
2r 
/1/2 = -2, 
(T 
(14) 
we find, with W(q, k) as given in (5), and C independent of k: 
rC = -12'1j;(k)-r2 {.P(k) W£(s,;) ds = 12 'lj;(k)>..'(k)- v'(k), (15) lo s-r2 + 12 - 1 
(15) implicitly characterizes the optimal investment strategy by the relation q = 
'lj;(k). 
We assume that the willingness to pay function is subject to random fluctu-
ations represented by the stochastic process Qt. In order to obtain an explicit 
solution, we assume that W is a linear function of q, 
W(q,k) = F(k)q, (16) 
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with F'(k) > 0 and F"(k) < 0. The equilibrium price for the optimally deter-
mined capacity is the marginal willingness to pay: 
(17) 
Using this equation, we can find the critical price level p* at which investment 
takes place. From (12) we have that the critical level for investment is q = 1/J( k ), 
or in terms of (17), 
p* = 1/J(k)F'(k). (18) 
From (14) and another relation between the roots of the characteristic equa-
tions 
27] 
/1 +/2 = 1--, q2 
we derive the additional relation 
/2-1 
/2 
/1 
/1 -1 
T-7] 
·--
T 
Using (18) in (15) (with A= F and v = 0) we get 
* /2 - 1 /1 T - 7] p = rC = rC. 
/2 /1- 1 T 
(19) 
(20) 
Hence the socially optimal strategy is to invest as the market price exceeds the 
critical level p*. Note that since 1 2 < 0 we have p* > rC, and hence it is not 
optimal to invest once the price reaches the long term marginal cost. 
3 The monopoly solution 
A monopolist maximizing expected net present value of future profit has to solve 
the problem 
H(t,q,k) = supEt,q,k{loo 7r(Qs,Ks)e-rsds- ce-rsdKs}, (21) 
u. t 
where 1r( Qt, Kt) denote the monopoly profit. Since there are no variable cost in 
this model, the profit is given as 
1r(q, k) = maxxF'(x)q, 
:r<k 
(22) 
where x is the quantity produced by the monopolist at time t, and where the 
output price is derived from the market clearing condition (17). Note that the 
optimal Xt is independent of Qt, hence if optimal Xt is less than Kt at some time 
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tit will never be optimal to invest any further at any future time s > t. When 
demand is elastic, i.e., 
F"(x )x 
F'(x) > -l, (23) 
for all x, we get that Xt = Kt is optimal and hence optimal profit is KtF'(Kt)Qt = 
f(Kt)Qt. 
Note that the only difference between the monopoly problem and the problem 
of finding the social optimum, is that F is replaced by f. Thus, assuming f is 
concave we solve the problem faced by the monopolist by replacing F by fin the 
solution (18) and (20 )1 . Hence, the optimal solution is to invest once marginal 
profit, f'(Kt)Qt, exceeds p*. Since · 
f'(Kt)Qt = F'(Kt)Qt + KtF"(Kt)Qt = Pt + KtF"(Kt)Qt, (24) 
the investment criterion can be reformulated as to invest when: 
(25) 
The optimal investment strategy is of the same form as the socially optimal 
investment strategy, but with a higher trigger price. Thus, the monopolist will 
underinvest and hence produce less than the socially optimal level of production. 
4 The market equilibrium 
In this section we will derive the market equilibrium. Like in an Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium we will assume that the agents know the equilibrium price that will 
prevail at any time and any state of the world. It will turn out that with risk 
neutrality it would have been sufficient to assume rational expectations. 
The problem of determining the optimal time to exercise a real option (i. 
e. undertake an investment in physical capital) is different from the problem of 
when to exercise a financial option. The reason is that exercising a real option 
affects the equilibrium price. When an agent exercises a financial call option, 
the asset is bought and sold at the same moment in time, and the asset price is 
not influenced. On the other hand, when a real option is exercised, additional 
production capacity is acquired, the supply of the product is increased and the 
market price is influenced. 
Let us return to the market considered in section 2. Since the equilibrium is 
socially efficient we know from section 2 that in equilibrium the agent waits for 
a trigger price p, and starts investing once the price exceeds this level, i.e. once 
Pt 2: p. By social efficiency we know that p = p*, but we will derive the level of 
p by an independent argument. 
1The use of theorem 1 requires that f is increasing and concave. The fact that f is increasing 
is a consequence of the assumption about the elasticity, but some extra requirement on F are 
implicit in the assumption that f is concave. 
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If Pt is infinitesimally higher than p, all agents want to exercise their options. 
The increase in production capacity would immediately press the price down to 
p. Hence, in the case of many identical producers there exists an upper bound 
on the price process and the price cannot exceed p. 
To describe the price process mathematically in this case we argue as follows: 
As long as the price is less than p the process Pt should behave like the 
geometric Brownian motion Qt, since Kt is constant there. This follows by using 
Ito's lemma on (17): 
F1(Kt)dQt + F 11(Kt)QtdKt 
F 1(Kt}'IQtdt + F 1(Kt)CTQtdBt 
TJPtdt + CT PtdBt, 
(26) 
if Pt < p. However, as soon as Pt reaches the value p the instantaneous increase 
in production capacity pushes the price back to the level below p again. This 
means that Pt for any t should satisfy a stochastic differential equation of the 
form: 
dPt = TJPtdt + CT PtdBt- X{p}(Pt)det; Po= p < p, eo = 0, (27) 
for some non-decreasing stochastic process et which only increases for 
tEA= A(w) = {t 2:: O;Pt =p}. (28) 
Moreover, we require that Pt ::; p always and that A( w) has zero Lebesgue mea-
sure, a.s. (the last condition is reasonable since we cannot have u; = oo on a set 
oft-values of positive measure (see Theorem 1).) 
The equation (27) is called a Skorohod stochastic differential equation (in the 
two unknown processes Pt and et)· According to a theorem due to Skorohod, 
Watanabe, Anderson and Grey (see Freidlin (1985), Th. 6.1) there exists under 
the given condition a unique solution (Pt, et) of this equation. The process Pt is 
called the reflection of the process Qt at p, and et is called the local time of Pt at 
p. 
To derive the market equilibrium we need to know the value of a unit capacity 
when the price is reflected at a given level p. We will let the discount rate depend 
upon the price. I.e. we must know: 
(29) 
where P$ is the reflection of Qt at p. 
From a theorem in Freidlin (1985, Th. 5.2), we have that: 
Theorem 2 Suppose g E 0 2 solves the equation: 
(30) 
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1-
with g(O) = 0, and g'(p) = 0 then 
g(p) = EP[l00 Pse~p(-ls r(Pz)d~ )ds], (31) 
where Ps is the reflected process given in {27). 
An intuitive explanation for the boundary condition g'(p) = 0 is that as 
Pt = p, it does not matter whether the nonreflected process increases or decreases, 
the effect on the reflected process is equivalent, and hence g'(p) = 0. 
In this section we will consider the case that r is independent of p. In the 
next section we argue that under the assumption of CAPM we can reduce the 
general problem to this specific case. The general solution to (30) with constant 
r is (using the first boundary condition) 
1 
g(p) = --p + vp'"'~l, 
r-ry (32) 
where 11 is the positive root of the characteristic equation, and v is a constant. 
The second boundary condition gives the equation: 
_P_ + V/1P71 = 0. 
r-ry 
(33) 
For p to constitute an equilibrium, it must not be profitable for anyone to deviate 
from the strategy 
J. _ { 0 for Pt < p 
tt - oo otherwise. (34) 
where lit is the rate of investment for agent i at time t. If the present value of the 
investment is zero for Pt = p this will be the case. I.e. it will not be profitable 
for anyone to deviate from the strategy (34): investing for Pt < p gives a present 
value less than zero, and the policy to wait for prices strictly higher than p will 
not give any investment. Hence the last condition identifying the equilibrium 
level of p is that the expected present value of future profit from unit capacity at 
Pt = p, must be equal to the unit cost of investment. When r is independent of 
P, the expected present value is given by (32), and we get: 
g(p) = _P_ + vp'"'~l =C. 
r-ry 
Combining (33) and (35) we get: 
, /1 r- TJ C * p= ·--r =p. 
11 -1 r 
The last equality was derived from (20). 
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(35) 
(36) 
5 The oligopoly solution 
Suppose that the market consists of a small number of players. Assume for a 
moment that it is optimal for each player to produce at full capacity at all points 
of time. Then the argument from the previous section will apply even with only 
two players. Nobody can gain from deviating from the investment strategy of 
infinite rate of investment for Pt > p*. 
It remains to justify the assumption that it is optimal for the players to 
produce at full capacity. If player i charges a price Pi where Pi > P3 for all j =f. i, 
he faces a demand D(pi)- Q-i, where Q-i is the total supply from all firms 
except i, and D( ·) is the market demand. Now suppose that all players charges 
a price equal to the market clearing price, and hence produces at full capacity 
utilication. Let Si = ~ be i's market share at full capacity utilization. Then 
a straightforward calculations shows that i cannot increase profit by charging a 
higher price if 
F"(x )x 1 
_...:,.....:,__ > --
F'(x) si · (37) 
Since t ~ 1, this inequality is obviously staisfied if (23) is satisifed. In this 
case, it is even optimal for the monopolist to produce at full capacity, hence in 
this case it will obviously be optimal for the oligopolists as well. 
Note, however, that the market shares will change over time. Thus, to study 
the equilibrium in the case that (23) is not satified, we would have to specify 
more carefully the relative speed of investment. There are special cases where 
the oligopoly solution is still equal to the market equilibrium even for elasticities 
less than -1. To take an example consider a market with tho palyers with equal 
market share, and equal speed of investment, and where the elasticity is higher 
than -2. A througout analysis of the cses with elsticities less than -1 is, however, 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 Risk adjustment 
In the previous section we have assumed risk neutrality. This is a very strong 
assumption, and we wish to relax it. Since the market equilibrium is is an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium that is known to be socially efficient, there is thus no need 
to consider risk adjustment for the social optimum and the market equilibrium 
separately. It turns out to be easier to consider the market equilibrium. 
Note that in the market equilibrium the firms are indifferent between investing 
and not investing as Pt = p. It is thus optimal for a single firm not to invest at 
any time. Consider a firm with a unit capacity that follows this strategy. What 
is the market value of a share in this firm? 
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Note that equation (30) in theorem 2 allows r to depend upon p. If the 
equilibrium price can be found by discounting the future revenues with a discount 
rate r(Pt) depending only upon Pt, the value of the firm will be Gt = g(Pt) where 
g(Pt) is the function given in theorem 2. Suppose for a moment that this is the 
case. Then Gt will be an Ito process, even though Pt has a singular component. 
The singularity at Pt = p has no effect on Gt since g'(p) = 0. Since Gt is an Ito 
process the equilibrium rate of return is determined in the Consumption based 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). 
In CCAPM equilibrium requires that the return r on an asset with price St 
with diffusion term CTStdBt is equal to: 
(T 
r = ro + PBm-(rm- ro) =To+ J.LCT, 
Cim 
(38) 
where PBm is the correlation between Bt and the market portfolio, Urn and Tm is 
standard deviation and return on the market portforlio. Finally 
PBm( ) J.L = -- Tm - To · 
Cim 
To apply this result we need to know the diffusion term of the process Gt. By 
the generalized Ito rule the diffusion term of Gt is 
g'(Pt) 
g(Pt) CTGtdBt. 
Hence the required rate of return in the CCAPM depends only upon Pt as 
assumed, and the required rate of return is: 
Inserting (39) into (30) gives 
g'(p) 
T(p) = To + J.LCTP g(p) . 
- Tog(p) + ijpg'(p) + ~u2lg''(p) = -p, 
where 
7J = 7J - J.L . CT. 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
Thus the appropriate risk adjustment is equivalent to adjusting the growth rate 
of Qt from 7J to ij. 
By a similar argument we can show the same result in the monopoly case. We 
conclude that in both these cases the appropriate risk adjustment is to adjust the 
expected growth rate of the price process, and use the risk-free rate of return. 
Similar results are well known in option pricing theory. (See Harrison and Kreps 
(1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981) and Cox, Ingiersoll and Ross (1985).) For real 
options a similar result was derived in McDonal and Siegel (1986) 
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7 The relation between the reflected and the 
unreflected processes 
Let Pt denote the price process reflected at p*, and let Pt denote the unreflected 
version of the same process. From previous studies of real options (for instance 
McDonald and Siegel (1986)) we know the optimal time of investment if the 
product price is not reflected. It turns out to be optimal to delay investment 
until Pt reaches the level p*, which is the market equilibrium reflection price level 
derived in this paper. As a consequence of this obervation we will show that the 
difference in value of an unit capacity with prices Pt and Pt is equal to the value 
of a traditional option. 
To be more precise, let V(p) be the value of a traditional real option given 
that the price process starts in p, i.e., 
( 42) 
where T is the optimal timing of the investment. The value, U(p) of a unit 
capacity with nonreflected prices is: 
( 43) 
Let G(P) denote the value of a unit capacity when the prices is reflected. Our 
claim is then that: 
U(p)- G(p) = V(p). (44) 
The claims is derived as follows, 
U(p)- G(p) EP{f000 (Pt- Pt)e-rtdt} 
EP{J:O(Pt- Pt)e-rtdt} 
EP{JT00 Ptcrtdt- ce-rT}- EP{f-r00 Pte-rtdt- ce-rT} (45) 
EP{f-roo Pte-rtdt- ce-rT} 
V(p). 
The second equation follow from the fact that Pt = Pt until the process reaches 
the reflection level. In the third equation we just add and substract the same 
amount C e-r-r. The forth equation follows from the equilibrium condition that 
future value of production must be equal to investment cost for Pt = p*. 
To interpret this result we compare a market where the price of output is 
exogenously given as in traditional real option theory, with the market where 
everybody has an infinite amount of the option. In this last case the option value 
has to be zero, since there is no scarcity in options. The output price is reflected 
exactly at the level wich makes the value of the real option zero. The previous 
result states that the reflection reduces the value of an already installed unit of 
capacity with the same amount. 
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